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INSANITY ACQUITTEES IN THE COMMUNITY:
LEGAL FOUNDATIONS AND CLINICAL
CONUNDRUMS
Michael J. Vitacco*
ABSTRACT

This Article will provide an in-depth discussion of legal cases that
have shaped American policy dealing with individuals found not
guilty by reason of insanity (NGRI) and deemed fit to return to the
community. This Article will discuss several aspects of conditional
release relevant to the legal community. Such factors include societal
attitudes, relevant legal case law, and data-supported outcomes of
individuals placed back in the community. In addition, this Article
will deal with issues related to violence risk assessment and evaluate
risk assessment effectiveness in determining who may be an
appropriate candidate for community return. Contrary to popular
belief, individuals adjudicated NGRI, even for violent offenses, are
generally not at high-risk for future violence. This review will present
information demonstrating the low recidivism risk by individuals
adjudicated NGRI and released back to the community. This Article
demonstrates the promise of conditional release for insanity
acquittees from both public safety and fiscally responsible positions.
This Article summarizes and lays out arguments for continued, and
potentially even expanded, use of conditional release to properly
manage insanity acquittees.
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INTRODUCTION
The not guilty by reason of insanity defense (NGRI) remains one
of the most debated and contested areas of mental health law, replete
with legal, moral, and political overtones. The idea that someone can
commit a crime, even a violent one, and be found non-responsible in
the eyes of the law, has created a public backlash against the insanity
defense, including its abolition in four states (Kansas, Montana,
Idaho, and Utah).1 Despite the unpopularity of the NGRI defense,
there has been an increasing trend toward discharging insanity
acquittees from the hospital back to community placements.2
Although society is often against a return to the community for
insanity acquittees, it is fiscally and clinically prudent to allow such
conditional discharges to continue. These individuals are not simply
discharged to the community with unfettered access to the
community. Instead, insanity acquittees must follow a series of
conditions in order to maintain their newfound freedoms. Known as
conditional release, insanity acquittees typically must remain
medication compliant, attend specialized therapy, not possess
weapons, abstain from substance abuse, and, of course, not engage in
criminal behavior.
Several landmark cases over the previous twenty-five years have
paved the way for the development of specialized programs to treat
and maintain NGRI acquittees in their respective communities.3

1. Daniel J. Nusbaum, The Craziest Reform of Them All: A Critical Analysis of
the Constitutional Implications of Abolishing the Insanity Defense, 87 CORNELL L.
R. 1509, 1515 (2002); see generally Patricia K. Fox, Commentary: Biases That Affect
the Decision to Conditionally Release an Insanity Acquittee, 36 J. AM. ACAD.
PSYCHOL. & L. 337 (2008).
2. See Michael J. Vitacco et al., Evaluating Conditional Release in Not Guilty by
Reason of Insanity Acquittees: A Prospective Follow-Up Study in Virginia, 38 L. &
HUM. BEHAV. 346, 353 (2014).
3. See, e.g., Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71 (1992). See generally Stephen
Bieber et al., Predicting Criminal Recidivism of Insanity Acquittees, 11 INT’L J.L. &
PSYCHIATRY 105 (1998) (supporting the need for the treatment of mental illness in
eliminating violent and nonviolent recidivism); J. Steven Lamberti et al., The Role of
Probation in Forensic Assertive Community Treatment, 62 PSYCHIATRIC SERVS. 418
(2011) (demonstrating how probation agents mandating treatment can play a critical
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Additionally, many legislatures have acted in accordance with this
judicial shift through the provision of legal mechanisms for releasing
individuals adjudicated NGRI back to the community. This Article
focuses on substantial areas of conditional release. Part I unpacks
attitudes toward the insanity defense and its influence on the
treatment of insanity acquittees. This part considers the growing
trend of allowing insanity acquittees to be returned to their respective
communities, even in light of substantial misinformation perpetuated
regarding the relationship between violence and mental illness. Part
II provides an overview of violence risk assessment, specifically as it
relates to potential danger with insanity acquittees and potential
community placement. This part outlines limitations of current risk
assessment methodology for predicting violence and recidivism with
insanity acquittees in the community on conditional release. An
important limitation of violence risk assessments is that most items on
such risk assessment measures are unrelated to actual conditional
release outcomes. Finally, Part III provides summaries of recent data
related to the success of conditional release across multiple states.
Such outcomes could provide an impetus for creating empiricallyinformed public policies related to the treatment and management of
insanity acquittees.
I. INSANITY DEFENSE ATTITUDES, CONDITIONAL RELEASE, AND
THE LAW
The proper way to treat and manage individuals adjudicated NGRI
remains an evolving area of public policy and the law. However, even
before policy-makers and legislatures consider how to best manage
insanity acquittees, it is important to point to numbers showing the
general discontentment with the insanity defense as a whole, which is
often viewed as an abused loophole allowing individuals to avoid
their just deserts for criminal behavior.
Several research studies have demonstrated society’s disdain for
the defense as a whole, and there have even been numerous efforts to
accurately capture attitudes. For example, the Insanity Defense
Attitude-Revised (IDA-R) was developed to evaluate overall
attitudes toward the defense.4 The authors who designed the study
role in ensuring insanity acquittees follow through on court-mandated communitybased treatment).
4. See generally Jennifer L. Skeem, et al., Venirepersons Attitudes Toward the
Insanity Defense: Developing, Refining, and Validating a Scale, 28 L. & HUM.
BEHAV. 623 (2004) (demonstrating how insanity defense attitudes can be measured
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found the scale was underpinned by two factors: (1) orientation
toward strict liability and (2) concern about perceived injustice and
danger.5 The authors found general discontent regarding the insanity
defense among this sample of jurors.6
In another article, Valerie Hans conducted a survey with 330
individuals who were recruited using random digit telephone calls in a
county in Delaware.7 Results of this telephone survey were mixed.
For instance, 49% of surveyed individuals were in favor of abolishing
the insanity defense, and almost 95% were in favor of reforming the
insanity defense.8 Yet, in an unexpected finding, just over threefourths of surveyed individuals endorsed that there are times when an
insanity defense is justified, and 64% endorsed the insanity defense as
a necessary part of our legal system.9
Studies looking at characteristics underpinning negative attitudes
have found that a positive view of capital punishment and
overestimating the use of the insanity defense are linked to a stronger
negative attitude toward the defense.10 In discussing what he
attributed as the “insanity defense problem,” Michael Perlin wrote
about a very salient issue affecting attitudes toward the insanity
defense.11 With the use of so-called “designer defenses,” the public

and individuals having poor attitudes toward the insanity defense can have real world
applications; negative attitudes toward the insanity defense reflect beliefs that the
letter of the law is not being followed in conjunction with the idea that criminally
insane individuals are being discharged from hospitals and harming society).
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. See generally Valerie Hans, An Analysis of Public Attitudes Toward the
Insanity Defense, 24 CRIMINOLOGY 393 (1986). Given that the study occurred within
a relatively small area of the United States, the generalizability of such findings are
certainly open for discussion. This is especially true since political affiliation may
play a role in attitudes toward the insanity defense. See id.
8. Id.
9. Id. at 396–410.
10. Michael J. Vitacco et al., Measuring Attitudes Toward the Insanity Defense in
Venirepersons: Refining the IDA-R in the Evaluation of Juror Bias, 8 INT’L J.L.
FORENSIC MENTAL HEALTH 62 (2009) (presenting similar results from two different
samples: sample one included 567 university students at a medium-sized college in
the Midwest; sample two consisted of 239 jurors from a small area in North Carolina);
Brooke Butler & Adina Wasserman, The Role of Death Qualification in
Venireperson’s Attitudes Toward the Insanity Defense, 36 J.L. APPLIED SOCIAL
PSYCHOL. 1744 (2006).
11. Michael Perlin, Myths, Realities, and the Political World: The Anthropology
of Insanity Defense Attitudes, 24 BULL AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY L. 5 (1996)
(regarding the insanity defense, explaining: “Because we continued to do precisely
what we have done for decades, centuries, and perhaps millennia. We spout
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has seemingly grown less tolerant of mental health issues, including
the use of the insanity defense amongst the most seriously and
persistently mentally ill. The concerns over faking the insanity
defense as a legal loophole are now firmly engrained.
In a thoughtful attempt at overcoming problematic attitudes
toward the insanity defense, one researcher suggested that a
flowchart, demonstrating the consequences and “time” completed
with an insanity defense would ultimately prove useful in the
reduction of biases.12 As noted in this thesis, the presentation to
college students of information regarding dispositional outcome had
an unattended effect: those seeing the information about dispositional
outcome became harsher in their sentence and less inclined to
support an insanity finding.13 This paradoxical finding underscores a
central issue in the field of mental health and the law: How to ensure
fair consideration of appropriate pleas for mentally ill individuals? It
also raises a critical question: If education does not influence juror
attitudes, what will? On this front, it appears views regarding the
insanity defense are very resistant to change.14
platitudes, we rectify myths, we create straw men, we talk angrily about insanity
defense ‘abuse,’ we look longingly to insanity defense ‘abolition’ or ‘reduction’ as
panaceas (not simply to the question at hand, but fantastically, as a means of solving
all contemporary crime problems); we speak scornfully of slick lawyers and deceitful
experts; we automatically assume that a defendant who raises the insanity defense
must be faking (although, at least one court opinion and one voter survey revealssomewhat remarkably, I thought, that it doesn’t matter if the plea is ‘real’ or ‘faked’;
our antipathy is almost identical); finally, we deride psychodynamic behavioral
explanations of ‘crazy’ behavior when it appears ‘obvious’ to one and all that the
defendant, in fact, ‘did it.’”).
12. See Lauren M. Schlumper, Using a Flowchart to Reduce Juror’s Preexisting
Biases in Cases Utilizing the Insanity Defense (2011) (unpublished M.S. thesis,
Georgia Southern University), http://digitalcommons.georgiasouthern.edu/cgi/
viewcontent.cgi?article=1442&context=etd [https://perma.cc/LF99-5GWK]. The use,
and ultimate effectiveness, of such a system remains very much an empirical question.
As noted in the body of this review, the presentation of the flowchart went against
the desired result and increased the likelihood a defendant would receive a prison
sentence. Id. Certainly, it could be argued the use of university students as your lone
sample limits the generalizability of these results; however, consistent findings have
been reported using both samples of undergraduates and venirepersons. Id.
13. Id.
14. See generally Marc F. Abramson, The Criminalization of Mentally
Disordered Behavior: Possible Side Effects of a New Mental Health Law, 23 HOSP. &
COMM. PSYCHIATRY 13 (1972). This article notes that when it comes to issues with
individuals with mental illness, financial concerns (both of the individual patient and
of the state) are frequently highlighted, but the high social cost of stigmatization is
not considered to an appropriate extent. Id. Likewise, individuals who are released
from prison after completing their sentence generally return to their respective
communities with little to no follow-up. Id. In comparing insanity acquittees to
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The importance of understanding insanity defense attitudes when
considering the conditional release of acquittees is evident. If society
is opposed to individuals being adjudicated not criminally responsible
on the basis of their mental illness, their subsequent integration to the
community would seemingly evoke more problematic responses. The
idea that society is opposed to the return of NGRI acquittees is a
logical downward extension stemming from the strong negative
attitudes toward the insanity defense. Yet, specific research has not
been conducted on attitudes toward the return of insanity acquittees
to the community. Moreover, understanding the nature of the
insanity defense lays critical groundwork for furthering knowledge of
how conditional release functions.
The majority of society, based on research regarding the insanity
defense, does not seem to be unopposed to a return to the days where
the primary methodology of dealing with NGRI acquittees was by not
dealing with them at all. The typical method revolved around placing
them in long-term forensic hospitals with minimal to no chance of
release. Warehousing the mentally ill was the norm for many years,
until the 1960s when there was a concerted effort to move patients
from hospitals to the community. Such warehousing had dire and,
likely, unintended consequences, including poor mental health
treatment, higher mortality, and greater victimization, to name a
few.15 During this time, insanity acquittees were sentenced to
indeterminate sentences, which generally meant little-to-no chance of
actual release from the hospital. Once found not responsible for their
criminal behavior, these individuals were presumed dangerous and
were not afforded appropriate due process that would provide an
avenue for release. Yet, this area of law remains in flux.
A variety of legal cases have lit the path for insanity acquittees to
be released into the community, even though there remain substantial
challenges from the legal system and a high level of public distrust
individuals released from prison, statistically the former are more likely to commit a
follow-up offense, specifically a violent offense. Id.
15. See Joanne Karger, "Don't Tread on the ADA": Olmstead v. L.C. Ex Rel.
Zimring and the Future of Community Integration for Individuals with Mental
Disabilities, 40 B.C. L. REV. 1221, 1224–27 (1999); Nancy K. Rhoden, The Limits of
Liberty: Deinstitutionalization, Homelessness, and Libertarian Theory, 31 EMORY
L.J. 375, 380-81 (1982); Kenneth B. Noble, Deciding Consequences of Insanity
Defense, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 19, 1987), http://www.nytimes.com/1987/04/19/week
inreview/deciding-consequences-of-insanity-defense.html?mcubz=0 [https://perma.cc/
9X78-U43C]; see also Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715 (1972) (prohibiting the pretrial commitment, or warehousing, of those deemed incompetent to stand trial on the
charges filed against them).
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regarding mentally ill individuals with criminal records, often with
multiple crimes, including violent crimes, returning to their home
communities. This area of law not only requires a focus on defining
the limitations to government’s power relative to mandated
hospitalization, but also delving into the law’s role in conditional
release decisions requires analysis into legal definitions of mental
illness and dangerousness.
Limitations to mandated hospitalization of mentally ill defendants
with criminal charges began in the 1970s, a decade that witnessed
substantive challenges to the procedure and duration states used to
commit individuals, and the rights provided to individuals undergoing
commitment proceedings. The 1972 Jackson v. Indiana decision is
considered a landmark case in competency to proceed to trial
opinions.16 In reality, the case goes far beyond competency,
establishing that a state could not indefinitely commit an individual
on the sole basis of their incompetency to proceed to trial.17 The
Jackson case emphasized the necessity of treatment for individuals
deemed not competent to proceed to trial, while at the same time
curbing rights of the state to hold an individual indefinitely as not
competent absent of due process. The Jackson case was limited to
individuals not competent to proceed to trial, but this case was one of
the first to deal with the rights of criminal forensic patients.
The detainment of individuals adjudicated NGRI was taken up in
Foucha v. Louisiana.18 In Foucha, the United States Supreme Court
undertook the question of criteria needed to justify the continued
commitment of Terry Foucha, a man adjudicated NGRI on charges of
aggravated burglary and illegally discharging a firearm.19 Foucha was

16. Jackson, 406 U.S. 715 (1972). Jackson was deaf and intellectually disabled,
possessing extreme difficulties in communication. Id. at 717. The charges brought
against him were relatively minor and included two counts of petty theft after
allegedly robbing two women. Id. Although the crimes themselves were not serious,
the finding of not competent to proceed was essentially a life sentence for Mr.
Jackson as there was only a small likelihood he would be released from the state
psychiatric facility, given the governing legal framework. Id. at 719-20. The United
States Supreme Court ruled it was a violation of Mr. Jackson’s Constitutional rights
to be retained in a psychiatric facility on a finding of incompetency alone. Id. at 731,
738. In order to continue to detain Mr. Jackson there would have needed to be a
finding of dangerousness that would have justified continued hospitalization. Id. at
733-36.
17. Id. at 720.
18. 504 U.S. 71 (1992).
19. Id. at 73.
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hospitalized at a psychiatric hospital in Louisiana.20 The law in
Louisiana indicated he would remain hospitalized until he was no
longer a danger to himself or others, without reference to mental
illness.21 Foucha was diagnosed with a drug-induced psychosis and
antisocial personality disorder and denied release by Louisiana due to
existing dangerousness (he was involved in several fights when
hospitalized); however, the hospital clinical staff was of the opinion
that his mental illness had remitted.22 The United States Supreme
Court ruled, in a 5-to-4 decision, that dangerousness was insufficient
to retain an NGRI acquittee in the hospital, and that there needed to
be continued mental illness in order to satisfy the Fourteenth
Amendment.23 In oft repeated words from Jackson, the Court in
Foucha stated:
Due process requires that the nature of commitment bear some
reasonable relation to the purpose for which the individual is
committed . . . . Foucha is not suffering from a mental disease or
illness. If he is to be held, he should not be held as a mentally ill
person.24

Yet, the decision in Foucha is not without problems. Despite the
Court’s guidance, the decision failed to provide an exacting standard,
so Foucha’s criteria were very pliable by policy- and decision-makers.
As such, individual states demonstrate the satisfaction of due process
by showing the nature of the commitment is both reasonable and in
relation to the purpose of the commitment. In reaction to Foucha,
states have developed procedures for the release and management of
NGRI acquittees. Although states interpret Foucha differently, the
continued hospitalization of insanity acquittees is guided by
determinations of whether the individual remains mentally ill and
dangerous.25
While Foucha provided new-found protections, NGRI acquittees
can nevertheless find themselves in a unique legal category of

20. Id. at 74.
21. Id. at 73.
22. Id. at 74-75.
23. Id. at 86.
24. Foucha, 504 U.S. at 79 (citing Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354 (1983);
Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715 (1972)).
25. Vitacco et al., supra note 10, at 1788-1789. See also James W. Ellis, Limits of

the State’s Power to Confine “Dangerous” Persons: Constitutional Implications of

Foucha v. Louisiana, 15 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 635 (1991) (noting Constitutional
issues remain regarding the hospitalization and, subsequent release of insanity
acquittees to supervised placements in the community).
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presumptive dangerousness, which is often predicated on the basis of
an insanity finding.26 In Jones v. New York, the United States
Supreme Court allowed the hospitalization of insanity acquittees for
crimes, even if those crimes were relatively minor in nature.27 Mr.
Jones was arrested in 1975 for petty larceny and found NGRI.28 He
was committed to St. Elizabeth’s Hospital where a psychologist
opined Mr. Jones was in need of continued hospitalization as a result
dangerousness stemming from a diagnosis of “Schizophrenia,
paranoid type.”29 The Court in Jones made a clear distinction
between placement in a mental health facility and the nature of the
crime.30 The Court wrote:
A particular sentence of incarceration is chosen to reflect society's
view of the proper response to commission of a particular criminal
offense, based on a variety of considerations such as retribution,
deterrence, and rehabilitation . . . Different considerations underlie
commitment of an insanity acquittee. As he was not convicted, he
may not be punished. His confinement rests on his continuing
illness and dangerousness. Thus, under the District of Columbia
statute, no matter how serious the act committed by the acquittee,
he may be released within 50 days of his acquittal if he has
recovered. In contrast, one who committed a less serious act may be
confined for a longer period if he remains ill and dangerous. There
simply is no necessary correlation between severity of the offense
and length of time necessary for recovery. The length of the
acquittee's hypothetical criminal sentence therefore is irrelevant to
the purposes of his commitment.31

The Court understood that even individuals who commit minor
crimes may be potentially dangerous and warrant commitment for the
purposes of providing mental health treatment in order to reduce the
likelihood of violence to others or oneself. As communicated in
Jones, the mere fact that the insanity acquittee has committed a
criminal act minimizes the likelihood the individual will be committed
26. However, there has not been significant scholarship devoted to the latency
between rights granted for civil commitment and a legal decision minimizing the
state’s power regarding the detainment of individuals adjudicated NGRI. As
delineated in Jones, the mere presence of overt criminal activity places a higher
burden on the insanity acquittee to demonstrate they are not a danger to society. See
Jones, 463 U.S. 354 (1983).
27. Id.
28. Id. at 359.
29. Id. at 359-60.
30. Id. at 370.
31. Id. at 369.
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for “idiosyncratic behavior.”32 The law has been made clear:
behavior, regardless of how atypical or idiosyncratic, cannot itself
justify commitment absent dangerousness.33
II. VIOLENCE RISK ASSESSMENT WITH INSANITY ACQUITTEES
Prior to returning to the insanity defense and the Jones decision, it
is worth reviewing violence prediction in some detail. One prime
example is Seung-Hui Cho, the Virginia Polytechnic Institute and
State University student who killed thirty-two people (twenty-seven
students and five teachers) and wounded seventeen others in a
campus shooting on April 16, 2007.34 During his childhood, he was
isolative, with clear social awkwardness with both adults and peers,
and was frequently bullied.35 Prior to the shooting, Seung-Hui Cho
exhibited symptoms consistent with mental illness; these symptoms
manifested in the following ways: disruptive class behavior, bothering
and harassing female students (taking pictures of their legs), and
suicidal ideations.36 These behaviors led to a civil commitment
hearing where Cho was deemed to pose an imminent danger, but a
danger that could be managed and treated through outpatient
treatment.37
The outcome of the commitment hearing and
subsequent killings resulted in a change to civil commitment
procedures in the state of Virginia.38

32. Id. at 367.
33. Id. In a commitment case, idiosyncratic behavior was previously used as a
justification for civilly committing someone. At times, civil commitment was used to
‘put away’ relatives who were engaging in behavior that may be most aptly described
as embarrassing, but did not constitute a danger to themselves or others.
34. N.R. Kleinfeld, Before Deadly Rage, A Life Consumed by a Troubling
Silence, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 22, 2007), https://nyti.ms/2p7lQCM [https://perma.cc/
7C8Q-LRLS].
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Alison Pfeffer, ‘Imminent Danger’ and Inconsistency: The Need for National

Reform of the ‘Imminent Danger’ Standard for Involuntary Civil Commitment in the
Wake of the Virginia Tech Tragedy, 30 CARDOZO L. REV. 277, 291–92 (2008).
38. See generally Jane D. Hickey, et al., A New Era Begins: Mental Health Law
Reform in Virginia, 11 RICH. J.L. & PUB. INT. 101 (2008) (explaining the shooting was

the impetus for significant changes in the Virginia laws dealing with civil
commitment; changes were made in five areas of commitment law, including:
commitment criteria, mandatory outpatient treatment, firearm purchases and
reporting, privacy disclosures, and procedural changes; maybe the most significant
change was the $41 million added to the mental health budget to improve treatment
in an attempt to prevent a similar incident).
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In conceptualizing how the Virginia Tech and other cases could
have been prevented, it is imperative to not have hindsight bias and
think, “we knew it all along.”39 Such thinking is often prevalent after
a major event. Obviously, if violent events were predictable they
could be prevented. This argument has been a central theme in cases
dealing with the prediction of violent behavior. In Barefoot v.
Estelle, the primary question the Supreme Court considered centered
on the ability and appropriateness of mental health practitioners to
predict violent behavior.40
In fact, the American Psychiatric
Association (APA) submitted an amicus brief on behalf of Barefoot,
advocating the position that mental health practitioners are unreliable
at predicting violence.41 The amicus brief stated mental health
practitioners are incorrect more often than they are correct when
making predictions of violent behavior.42 The Court was not
persuaded by this argument.43
In recent arguments, the APA has not advocated for the abolition
of violence risk assessments, even in death penalty cases. Instead, the
APA has supported the use of empirically-based and appropriately
validated violence risk assessments.
Consider the American
Psychological Association’s brief for Sherman Lamont Fields.44 As
39. See generally Colleen Cannon & Vernon Quinsey, The Likelihood of Violent
Behaviour: Predictions, Postdictions, and Hindsight Bias, 27 CANADIAN J. BEHAV.

SCI./REVUE CANADIENNE DES SCIENCES DU COMPORTMENT 92 (1995) (demonstrating
how hindsight bias may influence predictions of violence by providing clinicians a
false sense of confidence in the accuracy of their predictions).
40. 463 U.S. 880 (1983). The decision in Barefoot, although it allowed predictions
of violent behavior to be made in court, was not an overwhelming endorsement of
the practice by mental health professionals. To the contrary, the Court allowed such
predictions of violence almost as a default. See also Randy K. Otto, On the Ability of

Mental Health Professionals to “Predict Dangerousness”: A Commentary on
Interpretation of Dangerousness in the Literature, 18 L. & PSYCHOL. REV. 43 (1994);
Jennifer L. Skeem & E. Mulvey, Psychopathy and Community Violence Among Civil
Psychiatric Patients: Results from the MacArthur Violence Risk Assessment Study,

69 J. CONSULT. CLIN. PSYCHOL. 358 (2001).
41. See Amicus Curiae Brief at 5, Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880 (1983) (No. 826080).
42. Id. at 4 (“Contrary to the claims of the prosecution psychiatrists who testified
in this case, psychiatric predictions of long-term future dangerousness, even under
the best of conditions and on the basis of complete medical data—are of
fundamentally low reliability.”).
43. Barefoot, 463 U.S. at 901.
44. See Amicus Curiae Brief at 11-12, U.S. v. Sherman Lamont Fields, 483 F.3d
313 (5th Cir. 2007) (No. 04-50393). In United States v. Fields, the APA submitted an
amicus brief disagreeing with the methodology of a testifying psychiatrist, Dr.
Richard Coons, who opined the defendant was likely to be a danger, but he based his
opinion on inadequate methodology, namely clinical judgment. Id. Since Barefoot,
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evidenced over the previous two decades, there have been changes in
the conceptualization and implementation of violence risk
evaluations. Moreover, these changes have led to more confidence in
the results of risk assessments and greater precision in their use and
accuracy.45 As such, the use of clinical judgment as a substitute for
empirically-supported violence risk assessments is inadequate and
without proper foundation for making such weighty decisions.
Ultimately, the question of the efficacy of risk assessment with any
population is an empirically-based question. With the case of insanity
acquittees in the community, the answers coming in have not
provided a bevy of support for the use of full-on, traditional riskbased measures. A quick review of extant data raises significant
questions about the current state of the science regarding predicting
violence and aggression with mentally disordered offenders,
specifically individuals found not guilty by reason of insanity and
conditionally released.
Currently, the Historical, Clinical, Risk-20, typically referred to as
the HCR-20, is frequently used in violence risk assessments with
insanity acquittees.46 In an article by Debbie Green and colleagues,

there have been dramatic improvements in violence risk assessments. As part of the
iterative process of risk assessment instrument development, the idea of clinical
judgment for violence prediction has gone by the wayside due to the statistical
superiority of structured measures.
45. There are a variety of instruments designed to predict risk across multiple
settings and populations. Multiple studies have demonstrated the superiority of
structured approaches to non-structured judgments. See generally Michael Doyle &
Mairead Dolan, Violence Risk Assessment: Combining Structural and Clinical

Information to Structure Clinical Judgments for the Formulation and Management of
Risk, 9 J. PSYCHIATRIC MENT. HEALTH NURS. 649 (2002); Jennifer L. Skeem, & John
Monahan, Current Directions in Violence Risk Assessment, 20 CURRENT

DIRECTIONS IN PSYCHOL. SCIENCE 338 (2014) (arguing for a transition from violence
risk assessment to research designed to understand the causes of violence and to use
information obtained from violence risk assessment to plans to reduce violence);
Kevin Douglas et al., Violence Risk Assessment: Science and Practice, 4 LEGAL AND
CRIMINOLOGICAL PSYCHOL. 149 (1999). Although there are many controversies in
the field of mental health law, the area of violence risk assessment is one where there
is a general consensus on the need to integrate empirically-based factors of violence
risk. However, the exact content of violence risk factors has not been agreed upon,
and likely never will.
46. KEVIN DOUGLAS ET AL., BRITISH COLUMBIA: MENTAL HEALTH, LAW, AND
POLICY INSTITUTE, MANUAL FOR THE HCR-20V3 (2013). In a recent paper, Kevin
Douglas supported the belief that the HCR-20 is uniquely positioned to be used with
conditional release risk assessments because it encompasses many critical items that
warrant consideration when evaluating whether an individual is suitable for release
from a forensic hospital. See Kevin Douglas, Version 3 of the Historical-Clinical-Risk

Management-20 (HCR-20V3): Relevance to Violence Risk Assessment and
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the authors considered the use of the HCR-20 with 142 individuals
adjudicated NGRI and released to New York communities over a
ten-year period.47 The results found very few items from the HCR-20
associated with conditional release revocation even though one of the
scales (Historical) demonstrated the ability to differentiate insanity
acquittees who were not revoked from those who were.48
Another example considers the state of Virginia, which employs a
customized risk assessment rating only used in Virginia for evaluating
NGRI acquittees.49 The specialized instrument, which consists of
twenty items, mirrors the HCR-20 by considering both historical and
dynamic risk variables.50 In Virginia, the items related to revocation
on conditional release were: previous failure on conditional release
and problematic adherence to hospital treatment. As such, the
expediency of the remaining items is questionable in reference to
generating predictive statements of risk for revocation or violence.
The results only change minimally when considering time to failure.
In that case, items considering previous failure on conditional release,
number of previous violence charges, and number of overall charge
predicted time to conditional release revocation.51
An additional study using the HCR-20 is worthy of mention given
its consistency with other findings here. In this study, the HCR-20
was the variable studied in reference to predicting release decisions
with insanity forensic patients in the state of Georgia.52 Two items
Management in Forensic Conditional Release Contexts, 32 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 557

(2014).
47. See Debbie Green et al., Factors Associated with Recommitment of NGRI
Acquittees to a Forensic Hospital, 32 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 608 (2014).
48. Id. (finding the Historical scale was significantly associated with revocation of
conditional release, but the other two scales were not related to revocation of
conditional release, raising questions of considering the entire HCR-20 in the
determination of risk decisions suggesting the use of the other scales to make release
decisions would be tantamount to adding error into the mix, stating: “Specifically,
approximately half (47.5%) of those with high scores on the Historical scale were
recommitted, compared with 15.4% of those with low scores. Further the Historical
scale was the only HCR-20 scale associated with recommitment when combined with
period of transfer.”).
49. Vitacco et al., supra note 2.
50. Vitacco et al., supra note 2 (finding limited support for the entire measure;
instead, finding select items were related to revocation or success of conditional
release; only previous failure on conditional release and problematic adherence to
hospital treatment were predictive of revocation of conditional release).
51. Vitacco et al., supra note 2.
52. See Michael Vitacco et al., Projecting Risk: The Importance of the HCR-20
“Risk” Scale in Predicting Outcomes with Forensic Patients, 34 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 308
(2016).
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from the “Risk” scale, a scale designed to predict future problems,
were associated with outcome. The two items were Building Stable
Environments and Reducing Stress, and were predictive of release
decisions when comparing insanity acquittees who were not allowed
to be discharged, those discharged and revoked, and those discharged
who were not returned to the hospital. Clinicians conducting
evaluations of conditional release must balance the knowledge that
structured instruments provide critical data, while acknowledging
limitations of the instruments, even in light of apparent face validity.53
In conditional release evaluations, it may be time to consider
moving beyond current risk assessment measures to more specific,
specialized risk items relevant to conditional release.
Extant
literature has identified several factors predictive of revocation of
conditional release in multiple samples across states. These studies
have evaluated data on conditionally released insanity acquittees
from Louisiana, Maryland, Virginia, and Wisconsin.54 Picking risk
assessment items and appropriately determining which insanity
acquittees are best suited for release to the community is of critical
importance. In these situations, the success of entire conditional
release programs is predicated on community-based insanity

53. Id. The Risk scale is designed to prognosticate community-problems and to
try and design interventions for preventing issues. One of the keys for successful
conditional release is the development and implementation of community-based
programming.
54. See generally Vitacco et al., supra note 2; Gina Manguno-Mire et al., What

Factors Are Related to Success on Conditional Release/Discharge? Findings from
the New Orleans Forensic Aftercare Clinic: 2002–2013, 32 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 641
(2014); Daniel Marshall et al., Predicting Voluntary and Involuntary Readmissions to
Forensic Hospitals by Insanity Acquittees in Maryland, 32 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 627
(2014); Michael Vitacco et al., Developing Services for Insanity Acquittees
Conditionally Released into the Community: Maximizing Success and Minimizing
Recidivism, 5 PSYCHOL. SERVS. 118 (2008). These studies have identified empiricallylinked factors that correlate with failure on conditional release. What is noteworthy
is that many factors linked to failure on conditional release are not listed on formal
risk assessment measures. Much of the information gleaned from risk assessment
instruments is not effective for insanity acquittees on conditional release. This is
critical for clinicians to consider. Instead, several common themes have emerged and
clinicians conducting risk assessments with insanity acquittees should consider the
following: previous revocation of conditional release, significant history with
substance use, presence of antisocial or borderline personality disorder, lack of
financial resources, and problems complying with treatment. The goal when
employing risk assessment is not simply to predict violence. Instead, the goal with
this population is the development of risk management plans designed to successfully
manage the NGRI acquittee in the community and protect the public.
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acquittees not committing significant acts of violence.55 Part III
provides specific information on how well current programs do in
maintaining conditionally released individuals in the community.
III. POST-FOUCHA ISSUES: DANGEROUSNESS, DIAGNOSES, AND
COMMITMENT
Beginning with the landmark case of Foucha v. Louisiana, states
have used conditional release to manage insanity acquittees as well as
to manage budgets.56 When done effectively, conditional release
programs save a significant amount of money for already stretched
state mental health budgets.57 As described earlier, the decision in
Foucha provided a pathway for states to set criteria for the release of
insanity acquittees. These issues would appear relatively straightforward. For instance, does the individual continue to have a mental
illness that results in dangerousness?58 However, this decision is far
from straightforward, and has frequently led to confusion, both for
clinicians and attorneys alike. As discussed below, the courts have
often decided cases in a manner clouding the diagnostic criteria
relevant for conditional release decisions.
Conditional release programs in their various forms have legal
precedent in both state and federal systems, but the manner in which
states determine to operate them can be vastly different.59 As a
result, states have developed unique plans for how to implement
conditional release. Critical to the argument are temporal issues
regarding dangerousness. For instance, insanity is focused on the
defendant’s mental state during the time of the offense; however, in

55. Vitacco et al., supra note 52. Vitacco and colleagues (2008) underscored the
importance of appropriate follow-up care, including housing. In fact, not having
appropriate follow-up services may prove to be a valid risk factor predicting which
individuals on conditional release may not ultimately be successful. It may also be
possible that this potential risk factor should be utilized to determine who is a viable
candidate for conditional release from a forensic hospital. More research is needed
on this topic and evaluating the importance of specific dynamic variables related to
successful community reintegration.
56. 504 U.S. 71 (1992).
57. See Ilan Melnick, Passageway: A Novel Approach to Conditional Release, 34
BEHAV. SCI. & L. 396 (2016) (describing how a conditional release effectively is costsaving for the state of Florida).
58. DEBRA PINALS & DOUGLAS MOSSMAN, EVALUATION FOR CIVIL COMMITMENT
(Oxford University Press 2012) (providing a history and current state of commitment
standards throughout the United States).
59. Patricia Griffin et al., Designing Conditional Release System for Insanity
Acquittees, 18 J. MENTAL HEALTH ADMIN. 231–41 (1991).
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conditional release the focal issue centers on the acquittee’s current
mental status and dangerousness. Yet, in making this temporal
distinction, some courts have allowed consideration of remote
violence in the prediction of future violence when considering
conditional release. As in Jones, once an insanity acquittee is
committed he or she has the burden to prove that he or she is no
longer dangerous.60 In federal law, on the basis of the Insanity
Defense Reform Act, insanity acquittees have the burden of proof to
show by clear and convincing evidence their release would not cause a
risk.61 In insanity release cases, “dangerousness” is an elusive, illdefined construct that can vary significantly across jurisdictions.
Along similar lines, the notion of mental illness in these cases is
ambiguously defined and agreement regarding diagnoses between
professionals remains elusive.62 It should be noted, however, that
most states have statutory definitions of mental illness.63 For
instance, one only needs to consider the Miller case to understand
that courts can rely on almost any diagnosis to justify continued
commitment for an insanity acquittee and rely on even obscure
evidence of dangerousness.64

60. Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354 (1983).
61. See 18 U.S.C. § 4243(d) (2012) (“In a hearing pursuant to subsection (c) of
this section, a person found not guilty only by reason of insanity of an offense
involving bodily injury to, or serious damage to the property of, another person, or
involving a substantial risk of such injury or damage, has the burden of proving by
clear and convincing evidence that his release would not create a substantial risk of
bodily injury to another person or serious damage of property of another due to a
present mental disease or defect. With respect to any other offense, the person has
the burden of such proof by a preponderance of the evidence.”).
62. PINALS & MOSSMAN, supra note 58, at 76–77 (indicating modest kappas for
major diagnoses and also underscoring that unlike other medical decisions, the
decisions on psychiatric diagnoses “usually depends entirely on clinicians’
observations and patients’ reports about their experiences”).
63. For example, in Georgia, the state in which this author primarily practices,
mental illness is defined by the following, found in O.C.G.A. 17-7-131 (2010):
“‘Mentally ill’ means having a disorder of thought or mood which significantly
impairs judgment, behavior, capacity to recognize reality, or ability to cope with the
ordinary demands of life. However, the term ‘mental illness’ shall not include a
mental state manifested only by repeated unlawful or antisocial conduct.”
64. State v. Miller, 933 P.2d 606, 616 (Haw.1997). Miller argued before the
Supreme Court of Hawaii that he was inappropriately denied conditional release. Id.
at 609. The court rejected Miller’s arguments for release and made several critical
statements relevant to conditional release in Hawaii, specifically as conditional
release relates to dangerousness and mental illness. The Supreme Court of Hawaii
ruled: “First, we see no problem with the circuit court considering the insanity
acquittee’s past misconduct in determining whether the insanity acquittee is still
suffering from a mental illness. The court has discretion to consider all relevant
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In Miller, a court-appointed psychologist testified that Miller
suffered from sexual sadism, antisocial personality disorder, and
psychoactive substance abuse and, therefore, met criteria for both
mental illness and dangerousness.65
Many mental health
professionals would not consider these diagnoses to reflect the
statutory definitions of mental illness or reflective of serious and
persistent mental illness, but instead indicative of character
pathology. Similar findings have been made in other jurisdictions,
that courts have shown the propensity to rely on diagnoses to justify
continued commitment, including diagnoses that would likely not
qualify an individual for an insanity defense in the first place. In State
v. Klein, the Washington Supreme Court ruled diagnoses of
polysubstance dependence and personality disorder, not otherwise
specified, were sufficient for the purpose of continued confinement in
a state mental health facility, as long as they bore some reasonable
relation to the purpose for which Klein was committed.66 The
Supreme Court of Georgia made a similar ruling regarding a
diagnosis of Antisocial Personality Disorder.67
In Dupree v.
Schwarzkophf, despite testimony from a clinical psychologist opining
a patient’s schizoaffective disorder was in remission, the court ruled in
evidence, including expert testimony, the insanity acquittee’s misconduct, and
observations of the insanity acquittee, in determining whether the insanity acquittee
is legally insane.” Id. at 615. The court went on to state: “The focal point of the
release proceeding is not on past acts, but on current diagnosis of a present mental
illness, disease or disorder that renders the person dangerousness.” Id.
65. Id. at 616.
66. State v. Klein, 124 P.3d 644 (Wash. 2005). In this case, the Washington
Supreme Court ruled on the continued confinement of Tina Klein, who stabbed her
twenty-month old nephew with a butcher knife. Id. at 646. The child survived and
Ms. Klein was found not guilty by reason of insanity, granted conditional release, and
ultimately remanded to Western State Hospital in Tacoma, Washington for repeated
violation of the terms of her release. Id. Ms. Klein petitioned the court for full
release on the basis she no longer suffered from a mental disorder. Id. at 647. In a 6-3
decision, the Washington Supreme Court ruled an insanity acquittee was not required
to have the same diagnoses that formed the basis for the plea. Id. at 654. The court
ruled that Ms. Klein “presented a substantial danger to others or a substantial
likelihood of committing criminal acts jeopardizing public safety.” Id. The dissent
was noteworthy as it embraced a more traditional definition of mental illness in
stating substance abuse is not a mental disorder, and it is more in-line with an
addiction. Id. at 654-58 (Sanders, J., dissenting). As such, the dissent believed Ms.
Klein should have been granted release. Id.
67. See Dupree v. Schwarzkophf, No. S11A0290, 2011 WL 2519534 (Ga. 2011),
vacated as moot by Dupree v. Schwarzkophf, 745 S.E.2d 279 (Ga. 2011). The court
vacated the opinion because Dupree obtained release prior to the court’s ruling on
his habeas appeal. Dupree, 745 S.E.2d at 279. The reasoning contained within the
vacated opinion illuminates the state judiciary’s stance on this issue.
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favor of Dupree’s continued confinement in a state mental health
facility because he also had antisocial personality disorder.68 In
Dupree, the psychologist also testified that Dupree “did not present
an imminent risk of harm to [himself] or others.”69 Despite this, the
court ruled the continued diagnosis of antisocial personality disorder
did indeed qualify Dupree for continued commitment and
hospitalization.70
Other states have yet to document the need for a clear link
between mental illness and dangerousness. For instance in the case of
State v. Huss, the Iowa Supreme Court focused their decision to
remand the case back to the district court on the need for a finding of
continued dangerousness, without considering Huss’s continued
mental illness as a factor.71
The final area of law regarding post-commitment issues is the
manner in which the court would interpret a breach of conditional
release that could lead to revocation. Similar to conceptualization of
dangerousness and potential diagnoses eligible for continued
commitment under NGRI, there have been differing responses to
what would warrant a revocation of conditional release and mandate
the NGRI acquittee to return to the hospital or other secure setting.
One only needs to consider the cases presented in this Article to

68. See Dupree, 2011 WL 2519534.
69. Id..
70. Id.. (stating that Dupree’s personality disorders qualify as mental illnesses as
defined by OCGA § 37-1-1 (12), which defines mental illness as a “disorder of
thought or mood which significantly impairs judgment, behavior, capacity to
recognize reality, or ability to cope with the ordinary demands of life.”).
71. See State v. Huss, 666 N.W.2d 152 (Iowa 2003). In State v. Huss, the Supreme
Court of Iowa focused on a conditional release of Loren Huss, who was found not
guilty by reason of insanity for the murder of his girlfriend. Id. at 155. He was
diagnosed with Bipolar Disorder with Psychotic Features and Antisocial Personality
Disorder. Id. at 155-56. The district court found Mr. Huss met criteria for continued
commitment despite reports from a psychiatrist working with Mr. Huss who opined
that he was no longer mentally ill or dangerous. Id. at 155. The Iowa Supreme Court
reversed and remanded the case back to the district court after finding Mr. Huss
remained mentally ill, but was not currently dangerous. Id. at 162-63. Huss had a
significant history of violent behavior toward women, and the murder of his girlfriend
was particularly heinous. In determining the definition of dangerousness for Huss,
the court relied on an earlier ruling where they said the following: “[t]o confine a
citizen against his will because he is likely to be dangerous in the future, it must be
shown that he has actually been dangerous in the recent past and that such danger
was manifested by an overt act, attempt or threat to do substantial harm to himself or
to another.” Id. at 155, 162. Based on the lack of substantial findings to support the
finding of dangerousness, the Supreme Court of Iowa mandated Huss’ release absent
a finding of dangerousness. Id. at 163.
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understand how various courts may differ on what constitutes a
mental illness for the sake of continued inpatient treatment with an
NGRI acquittee. Of course, any new criminal behavior could lead to
a return to a hospital or even to prison time.
Yet, how violations are conceptualized and handled can be done
quite differently across jurisdictions. Two cases focusing on the
revocation of conditional release exemplify the inexact nature of the
manner in which insanity acquittees can be revoked or allowed to
remain in the community. In the United States v. Crape, the
Eleventh Circuit allowed Mr. Crape to remain in the community
despite behavior that in most jurisdictions would have led to a
significant restriction or a loss of liberty.72 In this ruling, the Eleventh
Circuit appears to have diminished the influence of potentially
dangerous behavior as a condition of release. In a later case, United
States v. Washington, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that
violating court-ordered treatment was sufficient for ordering the
insanity acquittee to return to an inpatient facility and his continued
release constituted a danger to society.73 Notably, the Fifth Circuit

72. See United States v. Crape, 603 F.3d 1237 (11th Cir. 2010). In this case, the
Eleventh Circuit considered the case of Mr. Michael Crape, who was arrested and
charged after writing threatening letters to President Bush and Vice President
Cheney. Id. at 1239-40. Mr. Crape was found NGRI. Id. After being committed to a
treatment facility, then conditionally discharged, Mr. Crape began writing
threatening letters again, which led to the revocation of his conditional release. Id. at
1240. Mr. Crape appealed and the court of appeals ruled in his favor because writing
threatening letters was not considered to indicate noncompliance with treatment. Id.
at 1247. The court agreed Mr. Crape’s behavior may have been illegal and could
have led to his arrest, but did not warrant a revocation of his conditional release. Id.
See also Kavya Singareddy & Reena Kapoor, Conditional Release of Insanity
Acquittees, 40 J. AM ACAD. PSYCH & L. 141 (2012) (discussing the Crape ruling and
noting that the case raises significant questions about how to manage insanity
acquittees in the community who are treatment compliant, yet engage in potentially
dangerous behavior. In this case the behavior may be considered more salient given
that it is behavior consistent with acts leading him to be found NGRI.)
73. See United States v. Washington, 764 F.3d 491 (5th Cir. 2014). The Fifth
Circuit ruled that Mr. Marvin Goodlow Washington could have his conditional
release revoked after being evicted from a group home, which was part of his
prescribed, court-ordered mental health treatment. Id. at 498-99. Mr. Washington
was found not guilty by reason of insanity on a charge of bank robbery. Id. at 482.
The court rejected the defendant’s argument that placement in a group home did not
constitute treatment. Id. Furthermore, the court ruled Mr. Washington’s continued
release would represent a substantial risk to the public. Id. at 496. As a result, Mr.
Washington’s conditional release was revoked. Id. at 500. The court’s decision
emphasized that Mr. Washington’s placement was codified in his treatment plan, and
therefore his eviction was a clear violation. Id. at 497-99.
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considered Crape in their decision in Washington, but ultimately
rejected that reasoning.74
One such lesson to be gleaned from these decisions is that
conditional release providers should be highly specific in their
treatment plans regarding what behavior could warrant revocation.
Conditional release plans should include specific management plans,
including living arrangements and rules and regulations that must be
followed.
In considering changes to the law and its application in conditional
release programs, it is not surprising that states and the federal
government have relied on conditional release to manage insanity
acquittees who no longer pose a danger to society. Data from
insanity acquittees in Virginia, shows that a well-managed program
leads to high levels of success,75 which is often the result of specialized
housing services and intense community management.76 The data
presented in this brief section shows the overall success of state-wide
programs in providing intensive case management and supervision
services. I primarily focus on data from three states: Wisconsin,
Virginia, and Maryland.77 These three diverse states have remarkable
similarities. In addition, results from New York,78 are also discussed
in this section to enable the reader to evaluate conditional release
programs.
This author and colleagues evaluated the files of 363 insanity
acquittees on conditional release in the state of Wisconsin who were,
with comprehensive plans, being monitored in community-based
settings.79 The large majority of the sample maintained their release
74. Washington, 764 F.3d at 498 (“[R]eliance on Crape is misplaced because,
unlike the ancillary requirement imposed by the court in Crape, the residence
requirement here was a component of Washington’s physician-prescribed regimen.”).
75. See Vitacco et al., supra note 2.
76. Marshall et al., supra note 54. The Marshall et al. (2014) study reported that
195 individuals out of a total of 356 were readmitted to hospitals. However, the large
majority of these folks were never revoked. If programs work, hospitals are available
for medication adjustments, which actually serve to decrease overall revocations.
77. See Vitacco et al., supra note 2.
78. See Green et al., supra note 47.
79. See Vitacco et al., supra note 52. This sample included every individual
released during an extended period in the state of Wisconsin. The article focused on
two primary aspects of conditional release. First, factors relevant to revocation of
release. The second aspect focused on the overall success of the conditionally release
program. The study found high success rates for individuals on conditional release.
Most notable was the extremely low rate of new criminal behavior, and even lower
rate of violent behavior. The sample itself had a significant amount of criminal
behavior leading to the insanity plea. Specifically, 53.1% of the sample was arrested
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for the full time of follow-up.80 Moreover, if conditional release
works as it is expected, individuals are brought back into a secure
mental health setting before they decompensate back to manifesting
significant mental health issues. As evidenced in this study, consistent
monitoring can take a group that is at a high risk for violence, based
on their history, and minimize risk. Certainly, this has both public
health and public policy implications.
Another state-wide study on conditional release was conducted in
Virginia.81 The results of the Virginia study, which included 127
insanity acquittees, mirrored the study in Wisconsin in several
remarkable ways, including the behaviors leading to revocation.
Another state-wide database was obtained from Maryland and
consisted of 356 individuals on conditional release who were followed
for three years.82 Results were consistent with those from other
jurisdictions regarding factors related to revocation, but underscored
the overall success of a conditional release program in maintaining
individuals in the community. A state-wide study from Maryland also
demonstrated the availability of appropriate community-based
mental health treatment and its impact on minimizing problems with
insanity acquittees.83
Other research has generated similar results, especially concerning
low recidivism and showing the success of community-based
monitoring.84 To be successful, programs must appropriately use
for a violent offense and 10.5% of the sample had a sexually-based offense. Of the
total sample of 362 individuals on conditional release, 240 individuals maintained
their release during the entire follow-up period. Of the 123 individuals revoked, only
7.11% committed a new crime and only 3.68% were revoked for a violent offense,
none of which were homicides.
80. See Vitacco et al., supra note 52, at 121.
81. See Vitacco et al., supra note 2, at 348.
82. See Marshall et al., supra note 54.
83. See Vitacco et al., supra note 52. Out of the entire sample of 356 insanity
acquittees on conditional release the overall recidivism rate was 14%. When
comparing this number with prisoners from the state of Maryland, the overall
recidivism percentage for insanity acquittees is much lower than individuals released
from prison in the state of Maryland, which stood at approximately 40%. See Justin
George, Ex-Offenders Less Likely to Return to Prison, Maryland Officials Say,
BALTIMORE SUN, Sept. 30, 2013 at A1.
84. Gina Manguno-Mire et al., What Factors are Related to Success on

Conditional Release/Discharge? Findings from the New Orleans Forensic Aftercare
Clinic: 2002–2013, 32 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 641–58 (2014). In this ten-year study, over

70% of individuals maintained their conditional release. Just five individuals had
their release revoked as a result of new charges. Another research study
underscoring that conditional release programs, when monitoring is done correctly,
are successful. In contrast to the Crape decision, these results show the necessity of
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clinical recommendations for each individual even if the specifics of
follow-up care are difficult to implement in practice.85 Some of these
difficulties appear to stem from evaluator disagreement.86
CONCLUSION
Policy and mental health decision-makers should strongly consider
the positive evidence available regarding the success of conditional
release programs. Relying on empirical studies as a foundation for
conditional release programs is a positive alternative to allowing fearbased perceptions of mental illness to guide policy decisions. As
demonstrated by multiple empirical studies across states, the efficacy
of these intensive programs that monitor and ensure treatment
compliance with insanity acquittees result in a successful return to the
community. Once treated, most individuals with mental illness do not
commit other crimes, and returns to the hospital are the result of
violations of release and not criminal recidivism. Generating new
discussion and developing informed policy should be at the forefront
of future discussions on the best practices for successfully managing
insanity acquittees. It is hoped that this Article serves as just one step
in the process of implementing empirically-informed public policy
with insanity acquittees released into the community. Although
weaknesses remain in how decision-making for forensic patients
leaving the hospital is completed, such results do not detract from the
success of conditional release programs. But the bigger question
remains: Can conditional release programs be improved upon and
developed enough to generate even lower rates of recidivism and
revocations? The answer appears to be yes.
taking rule violations seriously with the goal of minimizing actual criminal recidivism.
Based on the link between mental illness and criminal behavior in this select group of
individuals it is imperative to minimize psychiatric decompensation.
85. Manguno-Mire et al., Are Release Recommendations for NGRI Acquittees
Informed by Relevant Data?, 25 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 44, 44–45 (2007). See also Eric
Elbogen, & Alan Tomkins, From the Psychiatric Hospital to the Community:
Integrating Conditional Release and Contingency Management, 18 BEHAV. SCI. & L.,
427, 430–32 (2000).
86. See Rebecca Stredny et al., Evaluator Agreement in Placement
Recommendations for Insanity Acquittees, 30 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 297 (2012).
Decision-making regarding forensic patients is an understudied phenomenon. This
article pointed out issues with reliability and validity concerning conditional release
evaluations. See also Neil Gowensmith et al., Decision-Making in Post-Acquittal
Hospital Release: How Do Forensic Evaluators Make Their Decisions?, 32 BEHAV.
SCI. & L. 596, 599 (2014). Both articles informed readers about the imprecision of
how conditional release decisions are arrived at and substantiates the limitations of a
lack of systematic structure in determining who is eligible for conditional release.

